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For several decades the United States has struggled to control its borders. In particular, it has wrestled to curtail the flow of illegal immigrants into its territory while permitting up to one million legal immigrants to settle each year. The 1977 US Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was tasked with investigating the problem of illegal immigration and producing workable reforms. After many false starts and much partisan and interest-group wrangling, Congress eventually passed and President Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. IRCA had three main strands. Better border security to prevent illegal entry; tough measures to prevent firms employing illegal workers; and an amnesty, in the form of legal residency and later citizenship, for most illegal immigrants already resident in the US. The amnesty was designed as a one-off practical and humanitarian response to the problem of tearing millions of people away from their families, homes and jobs. There would, the thinking went, be no need for another amnesty because employer sanctions and improved border security would halt further undocumented migration.  

In one sense IRCA was a notable success. A relatively smooth bureaucratic operation saw nearly three million previously undocumented persons granted legal residency, many of whom later went on to become citizens. However, it failed to stem illegal entry into the US, especially from Latin America and Mexico in particular. The employer sanctions were never fully implemented. The federal government was reluctant to prosecute firms employing illegal labor, undocumented workers found good quality fake documents, especially green cards and social security numbers, easy to come by, and the significant disparity in wealth between Latin America and the US and established sending and receiving communities all ensured that large-scale illegal migration continued.​[1]​ Moreover, forty per cent of illegal immigrants actually enter the country legally, on tourist or student visas for example, but overstay. While it is intrinsically difficult to measure precisely the number of illegal residents in the US, estimates put the number at around 2.2 million in 1988 after the IRCA legalization, but this quickly rose to 5 million in 1996, 7 million in 2000 and about 12 million in 2006. About half came from one country: Mexico. 

Partly in response to the large increase in the number of undocumented residents, the 1990s witnessed a sharp turn in popular opinion against illegal immigration. Anti-immigrant activists in California wrote and qualified for the November 1994 ballot a direct democracy initiative to expel undocumented children from public school, deny illegal immigrants access to most public services, and require state officials such as school teachers to report to the authorities persons ‘suspected’ of being illegally resident in the US. Proposition 187 won easily, 59 to 41. It also helped incumbent California Governor Pete Wilson win a second term in a famous come-from-behind victory and inspired the 104th Congress, Republican for the first time in forty years, to push ahead with the immigration reform agenda. The debate during the mid 1990s was dominated by conservative, anti-immigration forces. Liberal voices, promulgating the benefits of immigration and an inclusive message, struggled to be heard. There was serious talk of excluding undocumented children from public school and of revoking the birthright citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which awarded citizenship to all persons born on US soil regardless of their parents’ legal status. And Congress very nearly slashed the number of legal immigrants permitted to enter the US, which would have been the first significant reduction since the Quota Acts of the nativist 1920s excluded southern and eastern Europeans. Bob Dole, Republican presidential nominee in 1996, ran on a loud anti-illegal-immigration ticket, buffeted from the right by the even more anti-immigrant bombast and populist Pat Buchanan. President Clinton and others in his administration also spoke the language of the zeitgeist, promising to “shut the door on illegal immigration”.​[2]​ Many commentators called the debate mean-spirited, racist even. 

Given the tone of the debate in the mid 1990s, it is remarkable that in the first decade of the new millennium President George W. Bush is backing a guest-worker program and a ‘path to citizenship’ – an amnesty in the language of the 1980s – for most of America’s 12 million undocumented residents. Of course, it would be wrong to suggest that the opposition to illegal immigration has disappeared. It has not. It is still alive and strong, as witnessed by legislative activity in the House of Representatives, but it is important to recognize that the locus of debate has shifted significantly. Guest-worker programs and paths to citizenship are firmly on the political agenda, even if they have not yet been enshrined in law. During the Democratic presidency of Bill Clinton pro-immigration activists could not have imagined that such ideas would constitute a serious and central part of the contemporary political discourse. The shifting politics of immigration reform can be explained largely by a change in the electoral calculus of key Republican politicians in response to two main factors. The first is America’s changing demography, specifically the explosive growth of the Latino population and the relative decline of the white population. Whites are already a minority in California and are predicted to be so in the wider US by the middle of the twenty-first century. Latinos constituted just 6 per cent of the population in 1980. Today it is around 15 per cent, and by 2050 one in every four Americans will be Latino.​[3]​ As the numbers increase, so does their political power. The second factor is that Latinos are more politically active, largely in response to the perception that their interests were threatened by Republican machinations in the 1990s.​[4]​ 

The aim of this chapter is to chart how the politics of immigration reform has changed over the past decade. It will explore the anti-immigrant episode of the 1990s, examining the reasons for its rise, focusing in particular on the political calculus of key Republican politicians who chose to use the immigration issue for electoral gain. It will also explain how that calculus changed as the Latino population grew and become more politicized. 

The 1990s: The Wilson Model

The 1990s witnessed a significant backlash against illegal immigration. Its roots lie in California in the early part of the decade.​[5]​ There was a significant amount of hostility toward illegal aliens, in part engendered by their increasing numbers but also by a particularly long and deep recession. Many Californians thought that undocumented workers took the jobs of native workers, paid little tax and heavily used public services at a time when a stagnating economy could least support their presence. Others worried that Latinos posed an increasing threat to the white majority’s political and economic power. Unsurprisingly, some politicians began to speak out against illegal immigrants and blame them for California’s ills. One such high-profile leader was California Governor Pete Wilson. Facing reelection in November 1994, Wilson was in a precarious electoral position because of the recession and a natural Democratic advantage in the state. Moreover, he was unpopular with his own party activists after raising taxes early in his first term. His approval ratings were the lowest of any governor in California history and opinion polls indicated he was trailing potential Democratic challengers by large margins with the election only a year away. He needed to find an issue that would boost his popularity and around which he could construct a winning electoral coalition. In August 1993 he turned his attention to illegal immigration. In an open letter to the federal government he proposed denying US citizenship to children born to undocumented parents, excluding undocumented children from public school, and introducing a ‘legal residency’ card to prevent undocumented persons taking jobs and receiving welfare and healthcare benefits. The result was immediate and marked. His poll ratings jumped significantly, from minus 33 percentage points in October 1992 and minus 29 points in March 1993 to just minus 8 points in September 1993.​[6]​ Moreover, his focus thrust illegal immigration toward the top of the political agenda. Previously, never more than three per cent of Californians had identified illegal immigration as the most important problem facing the state – despite the recession and large number of undocumented persons in the state – but in September 1993 16 per cent did so, a dramatic increase in intensity.​[7]​ 

At the same time that Wilson began to focus on illegal immigration, grassroots anti-immigrant activists based in Orange County, California, came together to discuss what they could personally do about the perceived problem. Their answer was to write and qualify for the ballot a direct democracy initiative. In an impressive mobilization of activists and with only minimal help from a professional signature gathering firm, Prop. 187 qualified with time and signatures to spare. During qualification and the campaign proper, Governor Wilson provided no direct monetary help, but the California Republican Party and other individual Republican politicians made some significant monetary and non-monetary contributions. However, much more important was the oxygen of free publicity provided by the governor’s continuing focus on the illegal immigration issue, which raised the initiative’s profile. He reinforced the issue’s central position on the political agenda by running anti-illegal immigration TV ads, by engineering clashes with the Democrat-controlled state legislature on illegal immigration, and by suing the federal government to reimburse billions of dollars allegedly owed California for the cost of incarcerating, educating and providing healthcare to undocumented persons. In turn, Prop. 187 further increased the salience of illegal immigration and Wilson’s campaign against it. This symbiotic relationship benefited both sides handsomely. 

Wilson’s use of illegal immigration highlighted once again the electoral efficacy of wedge politics. It had helped propel him back to the Governor’s mansion and establish him as a potential Republican presidential candidate for 1996. Wilson’s strategy allowed him to win over some moderate white Democrats and a majority of independents while reinforcing his support among, and turnout of, white conservative voters. The salience of the illegal immigration issue and the triumph of the Wilson model of electoral politics encouraged Newt Gingrich and others to take up the issue and the strategy after the GOP’s spectacular 1994 midterm congressional victory, even though the Contract with America did not mention immigration and the new speaker had long staked out a pro-immigration position. Gingrich’s finely tuned political antenna told him that immigration could help him and his party win elections, but his new-found support for immigration reform was not merely based on electoral considerations. His conversion was also a product of his desire to reform the welfare system. He saw an opportunity to reduce welfare costs and enhance his party’s popularity by cutting benefits to immigrants. Gingrich’s problem was that undocumented immigrants, despite the rhetoric, actually received relatively little welfare support from the federal government and those costs that did exist – for education and incarceration – were largely shouldered by state and local governments and politically and constitutionally difficult to cut. Gingrich’s solution was to widen the net and cut legal immigrants’ benefits as well. Electoral and policy considerations, then, saw the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, better known as the welfare reform act, make swingeing cuts to legal immigrants’ benefits, making them ineligible for Temporary Aid to Needy Families (AFDC’s replacement), SSI and food stamps. It also 
permitted individual states to cut immigrants’ Medicaid benefits. 

Other key congressional leaders, especially Lamar Smith and Alan Simpson, the new chairs of the House and Senate immigration subcommittees, were more ideologically committed than Gingrich to the anti-immigration agenda and interpreted Prop. 187’s victory as a vanguard for their proposals to reduce the level of legal immigration. Their proposals to cut legal immigration were backed by the second report of the US Commission on Immigration Reform, otherwise known as the Jordan Commission after its chair, Barbara Jordan. Moreover, such was the anti-immigration climate, the report won even President Clinton’s approval.​[8]​ One lobbyist noted: 

In the spring of 1995, we didn’t think we could turn the restrictionist tide, could stop the reform juggernaut, and it looked like something close to zero immigration was on the verge of being enacted. The current system would be gutted, the safety net for legal immigrants would be shredded, and a national work verifications system would be imposed.​[9]​ 
However, Smith’s and Simpson’s attempts to reduce the level of legal immigration were thwarted by an unholy alliance of business interests and civil rights organizations and the skilful maneuvering of senior Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy and junior Republican Senator Spencer Abraham.​[10]​ And, while the House approved the provision to exclude undocumented children from public school – or the Gallegly amendment as it was known after its author, Congressman Elton Gallegly – the Senate did not. Nonetheless, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act significantly enhanced border enforcement, authorizing the doubling in size of the border patrol from 5,000 to 10,000 agents and building and reinforcing border fences. It also increased the penalties for document fraud and alien smuggling, expedited deportation procedures, introduced several new programs for employers to check potential employees’ immigration status, increased and tightened income requirements of sponsors, and excluded illegal aliens from most public welfare benefits and services. 

The Republicans’ anti-immigration agenda and wedge strategy forced the Clinton administration to ratchet up its own rhetoric and produce policy proposals to assuage popular opinion. The president did not want House Republicans setting the agenda. He was especially concerned that Pete Wilson would win the Republican presidential nomination and put California’s 54 electoral college votes out of reach. Clinton could not support Prop. 187 but he made serious overtures to voters on the hot-button issue of illegal immigration, arguing in the 1995 state of the union address: 

All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected, but in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. That’s why our administration has moved aggressively to secure our borders more by hiring a record number of new border guards, by deporting twice as many criminal aliens as ever before, by cracking down on illegal hiring, by barring welfare benefits to illegal aliens. 
In the budget I will present to you we will try to do more to speed the deportation of illegal aliens who are arrested for crimes, to better identify illegal aliens in the workplace as recommended by the commission headed by former Congresswoman Barbara Jordan. 
We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it.​[11]​ 

Wilson did not win his party’s presidential nomination, but Clinton’s eventual opponent, Bob Dole, also promulgated a stark anti-illegal immigration message during the primaries, reiterating on many occasions his support for Prop. 187 and the Gallegly amendment in the hope it would protect his right flank from Pat Buchanan and discourage the maverick paleo-conservative from running as a third party candidate.​[12]​ Indeed, Dole was so effective that Buchanan commented, “It appears Senator Dole is making an effort to reach out to our people… [He’s] sounding like us… I’m gonna sue that fella for copyright violations.”​[13]​  Even after securing the presidential nomination by winning the California primary in March 1996 and resigning from the Congress in June 1996 to campaign full time, Dole continued to lobby GOP leaders to include the Gallegly amendment in the final immigration bill, which would force Clinton to veto and allow Dole to claim the president was not serious about illegal immigration reform. Strangely, Clinton hit back not by claiming that Dole was an extremist on immigration reform but by arguing that he was not as tough as he liked to portray. The president actually lambasted his opponent’s liberal credentials, noting that Dole had previously voted against excluding undocumented children from public schools and in favor of IRCA.​[14]​ 

In the mid 1990s, then, an anti-illegal immigration discourse dominated the immigration reform agenda and many Republican politicians, following the Wilson model, sought to use the issue to splinter the Democratic coalition and get out the conservative base on election day. For Dole, however, the strategy was a failure, or at least it did not allow him to overcome his many failings as a candidate. Too few moderate white voters split from the Democratic Party and too many Latinos bolted from the Republican Party. Four years earlier George H.W. Bush won 48 per cent of the white vote and 35 per cent of the Latino vote. Dole won a similar slice of the white vote at 49 per cent but Latino support dropped dramatically to just 22 per cent. Another way to think about the Republicans’ collapse among Latinos is to compare the ratio of white to Latino support. Taking the four presidential elections between 1980 and 1992, Republican candidates won 1.5 white votes for every Latino vote. Dole by contrast had to win 2.3 white votes for each Latino one.​[15]​ The drop off in Latino support for Republican candidates was even more pronounced in California. While Bush Sr. won 1.2 white votes for each Latino one in 1992, Dole needed 2.7 whites for every Latino four years later.​[16]​ Perhaps unsurprisingly given his close association with Prop. 187, Wilson saw his Latino vote share decline from 35 per cent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 1994. Four years later, Republican gubernatorial nominee Dan Lungren took 24 per cent, despite running a Latino- and immigrant-friendly campaign and working hard to distance himself from Prop, 187, which he supported in 1994 when running for attorney general. The 2002 Republican nominee, Bill Simon, did little better, with 27 per cent, despite winning a majority of the white vote. The message was clear: Republican candidates were losing close elections because of a precipitous decline in support among Latino voters turned off by the party’s close association with anti-immigrant policies. While Wilson had compensated for the drop off by winning more white votes, the strategy did not seem to be working for other Republican candidates in California and nationwide. Moreover, in California, even candidates who made a determined effort to win over Latino voters – such as Lungren and Simon – failed to return to pre-1994 levels of support. 

The 1990s: The Bush Model

While most Republican voters and politicians expressed strong support for Prop. 187, not all did. Jack Kemp and William Bennett, co-directors of the Empower America think tank, were the first national Republican figures to oppose it. Kemp, previously George H.W. Bush’s Housing and Urban Development secretary, and Bennett, Ronald Reagan’s Education secretary, warned the GOP in 1994 that adopting an anti-immigrant agenda would push Latinos and Asians firmly into the Democratic Party’s coalition, just as the Republican Party’s hostility to 

the last generation of immigrants from Italy, Ireland and the nations of Central Europe…helped to create a Democratic base in many of America’s cities… Can anyone calculate the political cost of turning away immigrants this time?​[17]​ 
[The anti-immigrant agenda will] turn the party inward to a protectionist and isolationist and more xenophobic party… We are willing to concede that tossing logs onto the anti-immigrant fire might result in short-term gains, but believe that in the medium and long term, this posture is a loser.​[18]​ 

The dismal performance of Bob Dole and the fate of post-Wilson Republican hopefuls in California outlined above makes Kemp and Bennett’s warning seem particularly prescient. Ironically, Dole chose Kemp as his ’96 running mate in a late effort to liberalize the ticket and appeal to moderates, but it is unlikely that anything could have been done so save his campaign. Governor George W. Bush of Texas was another Republican who eschewed the Wilson model in the mid 1990s. Bush’s electoral strategy was and is, in most respects, classically conservative, emphasizing family values, religion, abortion and economic individualism. However, one aspect of the strategy is distinctively liberal. Bush’s political svengali, Karl Rove, has long recognized the increasing political significance of the growing Latino population and has sought to construct a majority governing coalition by marrying the Republican Party’s traditional advantage among white voters to a significant slice of the Latino vote. One way of doing so, which puts no strain on the conservative strategy, is to promote Bush as the friend of instinctively socially and economically conservative Latinos and Asians. The other way, which creates the contradiction at the heart of the Bush model, is to pursue a distinctively liberal, pro-immigration position. This means not only supporting high levels of legal immigration but also treating immigrants, even those who may have entered the US illegally, with respect. Bush’s pro-immigration message is not merely a hard-nosed electoral calculation, however. He genuinely believes that immigration is a force for good. 

Bush was one of the very few high-profile Republican politicians facing reelection in 1994 to come out against Prop. 187. His reward was a significant proportion of the Latino vote in the Texas gubernatorial election and a victory over the popular incumbent Democratic governor, Ann Richards, in a close contest. His comfortable reelection victory in 1998 with nearly 70 per cent of the vote, including half the Latino vote, plus his name recognition, folksy image and impressive fundraising ability, convinced many Republicans that the former president’s son was the party’s future. As its prospective and actual presidential candidate, Bush made several trips to California in 2000 to raise funds and campaign but snubbed Pete Wilson, meeting him neither publicly nor privately. Only four years earlier Dole had appointed Wilson chair of his California campaign, but Bush’s strategists did not want to risk damaging their charge’s reputation among Latinos by meeting the now demonized former governor. Bush’s target in an April 2000 speech to the National Hispanic Women’s Conference was unspoken but clear: 
It’s so important to have leadership that tears down political barriers, leadership that offers a future hopeful for everybody, leadership that rejects the politics of pitting one group of people against another, leaders that stand up and say we will not use our children, the children of immigrants, as a political issue in America.​[19]​ 








The first session of the 109th Congress saw much action on immigration reform, not all of it to the President’s satisfaction, however. Guided by the Republican chair of the judiciary committee, James F. Sensenbrenner, the House approved the ‘Real ID’ act (HR1268) on 10 February 2005 “to prevent another 9/11-type terrorist attack by disrupting terrorist travel”.​[22]​ The law sought to improve the security of drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards issued by the states. Only drivers’ licenses that meet strict, uniform national standards can be used for federal purposes such as air travel, and they cannot be issued by states to undocumented residents. The act also tightened up asylum procedures and gave the DHS the authority to build border fences, regardless of federal or local laws. The provision was designed to force the completion of a fourteen mile border fence near San Diego (mandated by the 1996 immigration act) that had stalled for environment reasons. While a successful Senate amendment increased modestly the number of temporary non-agricultural workers allowed to enter the US, the act did not include a guest-worker program (Democratic and Republican amendments to add one failed). It received Senate approval on 10 May and Bush signed it into law (PL 109-13) the next day, despite the absence of the guest-worker provision, because he was keen to signal to House Republicans that he would work with them on immigration reform. He hoped his support for the enhanced security measures would engender movement on his favored reforms later in the legislative session.​[23]​ 

House Republicans, however, did not deliver their side of Bush’s imagined quid pro quo, in part because the 90-strong conservative Immigration Reform Caucus led by Colorado House Republican Tom Tancredo was increasingly vocal and dominant. Under pressure from Tancredo, Sensenbrenner authored, sponsored and his judiciary committee approved HR4437, the Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act, on 8 December. It was an ‘enforcement-only’ act that snubbed Bush’s two key wishes: the guest-worker program and a path to citizenship for undocumented residents (also known as amnesty or legalization, depending on one’s political position on immigration reform). The full House gave the bill its approval, 239-182, on 16 December and it represented the first real fissure between the White House and its previously loyal lieutenants in the House. Two hundred and three Republicans were joined by 36 Democrats in support, while just 17 Republicans voted with 164 Democrats in opposition. The bill included four especially controversial provisions. It would make ‘unlawful presence’ in the US a criminal rather than civil offense punishable by a year’s prison (the length of sentence made it a felony rather than a misdemeanor); criminalize with up to five years’ imprisonment people ‘assisting’ illegal aliens ‘knowingly or in reckless disregard’ of their immigration status; increase the penalties for hiring undocumented workers and mandate employers to verify employees’ social security numbers against a DHS national list; and require state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal immigration law or lose federal funds. While the bill did not end birthright citizenship, to Tancredo’s disappointment, it did appropriate funds for an extra 700 miles of high-security fencing on the US-Mexico border, abandon the so-called ‘catch and release’ policy, and eliminate the 50,000 ‘diversity’ visas.​[24]​ 

Importantly, the provision criminalizing illegal immigrants survived a Sensenbrenner-sponsored amendment to his own bill to reduce the penalty of illegal residency in the US from a felony to a misdemeanor punishable by six months in prison. The judiciary chair recognized, too late as it happens, that the provision appeared mean-spirited and would serve as a lightening rod to immigrants, immigrants-rights advocates and many in the Latino and Asian communities. Even though the amendment would have liberalized the bill, only eight Democrats voted in favor while 191 voted against and were joined in opposition by 65 Republicans who wanted to maintain the felony penalty. Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi’s spokesperson Jennifer Crider explained, “The Democrats were not going to do anything to make it easier for Republicans to pass an atrocious bill.” ​[25]​ And, if it did pass, the Democrats hoped to be able to point to the provision as evidence of the Republicans’ extremism. In response, Dennis Hastert and Bill Frist tried to argue that it was the Democrats who were responsible for the provision making illegal residency a felony because they had failed to back the Republican amendment to reduce it to a misdemeanor. Pursuing the same logic, the Republican National Committee ran ads on Spanish-language TV in April 2006 blaming Senate minority leader Harry Reid and his Democratic colleagues for criminalizing immigrants: “Reid’s Democrat allies voted to treat millions of hardworking immigrants as felons, while President Bush and Republican leaders work for legislation that will protect our borders and honor our immigrants”, claimed the ad. A Washington Post editorial responded: “It takes a pile of cynicism to spin this one as Democratic callousness.”​[26]​

Some Republicans and most Democrats who opposed the Sensenbrenner bill, while disappointed by its success in the House, were confident that it could not win the Senate’s approval.​[27]​ As predicted, the bill and particularly the felony provision caused outrage. As senators battled over the immigration bill’s provisions early in the second session, hundreds of thousands of people came out onto the streets to protest, encouraged to mobilize by church groups and the foreign-language media. The police estimated that the crowd in downtown Los Angeles on 25 March 2006 was half-a-million and the organizers said one million. In Denver, Colorado, home state of Tom Tancredo, over 50,000 protested against a ballot proposal to deny illegal immigrants access to government services.​[28]​ 

While representatives in the House were especially concerned about how immigration reform would affect their reelection prospects in the 2006 midterms, the debate in the Senate was more closely tied to presidential politics. Judiciary committee chair Arlen Specter favored both enhanced border security and a guest-worker program with legalization prospects, but was put under pressure by the majority leader and presidential hopeful, Bill Frist, to produce a bill quickly. If he could not, Frist promised to introduce his own bill without the guest-worker program, which would appeal to the more conservative Republican primary electorate. John McCain, looking to mitigate his maverick tag, win over establishment Republicans and play to general election moderates and Latinos, supported a guest-worker program and a path to citizenship, along with increased border security. Meanwhile, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid threatened to sink any bill that did not include a guest-worker provision. In the event, Specter did manage to deliver a bill (known as the chairman’s mark) by Frist’s deadline, but the majority leader still brought his own bill (S2454) – based on the chairman’s mark but without the guest-worker or citizenship provisions and with a provision making illegal residency a criminal offense (a misdemeanor for a first-time offense and felony subsequently)​[29]​ – to the floor for several hours of debate, before allowing debate on Specter’s bill, thus drawing fire from both Republicans and Democrats that his presidential ambitions had trumped his institutional and party responsibilities.​[30]​ After a further two weeks of debate and about to leave Washington for a two-week recess, Republican senators finally agreed on a bill that included both a guest-worker program and the prospect of citizenship for illegal residents. However, Harry Reid prevented a vote on the Republican bill until the Senate considered Kennedy and McCain’s even more immigrant-friendly proposals.​[31]​

The impasse was broken when McCain announced his support for another compromise bill (S2611) authored by two Republican Senators, Mel Martinez and Chuck Hagel. Frist and Kennedy also indicated their support, as did about two thirds of senators. The Martinez-Hagel bill included both the guest-worker program and path to citizenship. Undocumented residents of five or more years (estimated to number about 8 million) could apply for a work visa and five years later citizenship. Immigrants resident between 2 and 5 years (estimated at 3 million) could apply for one of 450,000 green cards at a designated port of entry, while those resident less than two years (1 million) would not be allowed to stay. There would be a further 325,000 guest-worker visas for those applying from outside of the US. The bill included the now usual provisions beefing up the border, secure social security cards and more stringent penalties for employing undocumented workers, but it did not make unlawful presence a criminal offense like Frist’s and Sensenbrenner’s bills.​[32]​ 

However, partisan disagreements soon began to surface and prevented a vote on the compromise bill, even though there was enough Democrat (almost solid) and GOP support (about half) to pass it. Republicans complained that Harry Reid was preventing them voting on amendments to the bill, such as one that would postpone the introduction of the guest-worker program and legalization until the DHS had verified the border was secure. Reid was concerned that Frist was pandering to Republicans opposed to the guest-worker and legalization provisions and that the amendments would strip the heart out of the bill; he was also concerned that House conservatives would reject the Senate bill. McCain tried to break the new deadlock, unsuccessfully, by suggesting he had enough support to vote down any attempt to strip the bill and promised he and others would not support a bill torn apart in conference by House conservatives. Conservatives themselves worried that the Senate bill would repeat the failures of IRCA but on a grander scale.​[33]​ Some Democrats also wavered when several unions, including the AFL-CIO, came out against the guest-worker program. If conference did strip out the liberal provisions, leaving an enforcement-only bill, most Democrats would vote against it but in doing so would put themselves in opposition to the majority of Americans who wanted tough border-control. On the other hand, most Americans also favored guest-worker and legalization programs.​[34]​ Thus, if the Senate’s comprehensive reform failed and the Republicans’ position was defined by the House bill, the GOP could look extreme in the November elections. Such partisan difficulties and suspicions prevented the bill coming to a vote.​[35]​ 

A second large demonstration against the immigration reform agenda took place on 1 May 2006. The ‘Day Without An Immigrant’ attracted 250,000 and 400,000 to two marches in LA and thousands of others to marches around the country, where many protesters carried signs in Spanish reading ‘Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote. The protests’ effects were far from straightforward. In response to the scale of the first demonstration in March and the prospect that the Republican focus on immigration was mobilizing both immigrants and ethnic voters against the GOP, Hastert and Frist signaled that they may drop the provision making illegal residence a felony. It seemed that the tide was turning against the original House bill, which the Republicans thought would so help them in the November 2006 midterms. Similarly, some of the 36 Democrats who voted yes on the bill in Dec 2006 had by April 2006 began to question the wisdom of their decision. While a yes vote initially appeared to offer protection against potential Republican attacks of being soft on border protection, support for the bill increasingly looked like a political liability as the size of the marches against it increased in frequency and size through 2006. Commentators even began to suggest that the House bill and the debates in the Senate could help engender a new civil rights movement.​[36]​ However, the 1 May demonstrations led some observers and politicians to question whether they could be counterproductive. Passions on both sides were inflamed, politicizing the issues and making compromise more difficult to reach. Republican Mel Martinez, whose comprehensive immigration bill was the Senate’s main focus, argued that the “Boycotts, walkouts or protests are not going to get this done. This is an issue that isn’t going to get fixed on the streets. It’s going to take thoughtful action by Congress”.​[37]​ Bush’s spokesman Scott McClellan made public Bush’s opposition to the boycotts, while the anti-immigrant Minutemen Militia claimed that volunteers, donations and website traffic had all increased dramatically during the March, April and May protests. National polls suggested a majority of Americans had a negative view of the protests.​[38]​

Bush was also coming under increasing pressure from Republicans, especially Senator Specter, to take a lead in the immigration debate and help break the Senate deadlock. Bush, however, was reluctant to tie his credibility to a specific piece of legislation only to see it stripped out in conference or lose in a vote. His strategy throughout his presidency was to set out his broad aims, allow Congress to debate and settle the specifics, and then step in at the end, if required, to broker a final compromise between different factions. Bush was in a particularly difficult position on immigration reform. We noted above the divisions wrought by inter-party conflicts, but more important are the intra-party ones. The Bush model mandates that he must reach out to Latinos and immigrants without alienating his conservative base. While Bush managed to do this with some success in the 2004 election, talking about different issues to different audiences, it is much more difficult to compartmentalize when governing than running for office. With the GOP split between harder-line conservatives promoting an enforcement-only solution and moderates wanting a more inclusive, holistic one, it was inevitable that Bush’s attempt to pursue reform would highlight and indeed promote division. The ideological splits were exacerbated by the concentration of conservatives in the House, creating tension between the two chambers and making Bush’s brokering job more problematic. Each chamber has different electoral imperatives. Representatives, facing reelection every two years as well as a possible primary challenge, are more obsessed with short-term factors than senators with their six year terms and presidential ambitions. They have little time or reason to think about building long-term, nationwide majority coalitions. Even though national polls showed a majority of Americans in favor of the comprehensive Senate approach, the House Republicans’ electoral strategy depended on getting core conservative supporters to vote by appealing to their core values. With pre-election polls suggesting a notable decline in support for Bush among previously loyal conservative voters, in part because of dissatisfaction with his record and positioning on immigration, it made little electoral sense to back the president’s reform agenda. Thus, while Bush’s popularity helped many representatives secure reelection in 2002 and 2004, it looked likely in 2006 that any close association with the president would prove a handicap.

Despite these problems, and perhaps unwisely, Bush was determined to push forward on immigration reform, convinced he could overcome the divisions. Guided by new chief of staff Joshua Bolten, who was brought on board to give the administration new focus and direction, Bush raised the ante by taking his case directly to the American people in a televised presidential address on 15 May 2006. The national address, his first on a domestic policy issue, called for a temporary worker program and path to citizenship but pushed more forcefully the administration’s enforcement credentials. It sought to appeal to conservatives by emphasizing the administration’s plans to assimilate immigrants and to cut off the supply of illegal immigration by securing the border with enhanced fencing and technology, biometric ID cards for legal foreign workers, ending catch and release, more detention beds, yet more border guards and, controversially, deploying the National Guard to help patrol the border. Bush’s focus on enforcement was designed to mollify both House Republicans and movement conservatives, whose high turnout was electorally critical. Addressing a key GOP concern, he explained that his plan was not an amnesty because it did not include an automatic path to citizenship. Rather, illegal residents would have to meet strict criteria, pay a fine and back taxes, learn English and get in line behind existing citizenship applicants (IRCA had fast-tracked applications). Sensenbrenner was unimpressed: “Regardless of what the president says, what he is proposing is amnesty.”​[39]​ The administration clearly had a hard sell on its hands. Thus, in the days after the address, Vice President Dick Cheney was dispatched to Rush Limbaugh’s radio show, Karl Rove met privately with House Republicans, and the President again spoke by telephone with Hastert and Frist to persuade them of his proposal’s merits. These efforts were ill rewarded, despite the large amount of political capital spent by the President. He pleased neither conservatives nor liberals. Perhaps unfairly, a New York Times editorial portrayed the speech as a “victory for the fear-stricken fringe of the debate” and the President as “Minuteman in chief”.​[40]​ 

Despite the hostility to his proposals from all sides, Bush’s intervention did however invigorate debate in the Senate, which took up S2611 again in mid May. The political dynamics had changed in just one month. The Republican leadership and most Democrats recognized that the conservatives had the upper hand. Thus, while a bipartisan coalition of Democrats and moderate Republicans was able to beat back conservative efforts to strip out the guest-worker and citizenship provisions, many of the same moderate Republicans and a few of the Democrats also backed and sponsored several amendments to enhance the security aspect of the bill with the aim of making it more attractive to House conservatives. Successful amendments included building 370 miles of border fence; excluding illegal immigrants convicted of three misdemeanors or one felony from the guest-worker program and citizenship process; requiring certification from the Department of Labor that there was no domestic worker available to do a job offered to a foreign worker; and preventing guest-workers self-petitioning for citizenship (instead, affidavits would be required from employers).​[41]​ Perhaps the most controversial change was making English the ‘national language’ of the US. Such amendments alienated some immigrants-rights organizations and liberal Democrats, but had the desired effect of moving the two chambers closer together and increasing the prospect that the House would not reject the Senate bill out of hand. 

In the event, the Senate passed comfortably its comprehensive reform bill on 25 May by 62-36. Notably, a majority of Republican senators, 32, voted against and only 23 voted for. Conversely, only four Democrats voted no, while 38 supported it. The one independent, Jim Jeffords of Vermont, also gave the bill his support. 

As the Senate was due to vote on its immigration bill, President Bush and Rove once again met with House Republicans to persuade them of the merits of comprehensive reform, but again failed to move them. “The basic difference of opinion that we have seen on this issue between the House and Senate and the White House is real, it is honest, and it was exhibited on this meeting,” said John Boehner, House Majority Leader.​[42]​ Some House Republicans, including Sensenbrenner, said that they may be open to a guest-worker program but not legalization, but the prospects for a deal looked remote when Speaker Hastert reiterated that he would only bring an immigration bill to the floor of the House if it met the usual ‘majority of the majority’ criteria – in other words, it could win the support of at least half the 231-strong Republican caucus. Thus, although it is possible that the Senate bill could have won a majority of the whole House, with most Democrats and some Republicans in favor, it was not allowed the opportunity to do so because it failed the first, partisan hurdle. Moreover, the House leaders prevaricated on naming members of the conference committee. 

Two further blows to Bush’s reform agenda were struck in June. The first was the outcome of a special election for an open seat (to replace disgraced Republican Randy ‘Duke’ Cunningham) in California in June. In a close race, Republican Brian P. Bilbray took the seat running on a strong border security platform and against guest-worker and citizenship programs, which convinced House conservatives that any other policy than enforcement-only was electorally dangerous.​[43]​ Then Hastert revealed on 20 June that the House planned to hold 21 ‘immigration hearings’ in 13 states over the summer recess. House leaders claimed publicly that the hearings would tap public opinion and ideas on immigration matters, but they were in effect little more than a direct attack on the Senate bill and the president’s position. With one session was titled ‘Whether Attempted Implementation of the Senate Immigration Bill Will Result in an Administrative and National Security Nightmare’, they represented a remarkable breakdown of partisanship, which had served the GOP so well over the preceding decade. Moreover, the hearings sidelined congressional discussion on the Senate bill until September. The general opinion in Washington was that this would probably derail the reform agenda until after the November elections as there would be too little time to reach a compromise. Tancredo noted: “Odds were long that any so-called ‘compromise bill’ would get to the president’s desk this year… The nail was already in the coffin of the Senate’s amnesty plan. These hearings probably lowered it into the grave.”​[44]​ 

Comprehensive reform may have died, but House conservatives returning after the summer recess were determined to push the enforcement-only solution, spurred by their summer hearings, the president’s declining popularity, dismaying projections about midterm seat loses, and several poorly attended immigrants-rights demonstrations in early September. The House’s December 2005 bill was broken up into a series of mini bills, which were quickly passed and dispatched to the Senate. Despite the Senate’s long-standing opposition to the enforcement-only approach, it approved several of the House-inspired measures to secure the border, including a bill to build an additional 700 miles of fence along the 2,000 mile US-Mexico border.​[45]​ The Secure Fence Act, however, did not authorize any monies for its construction. A $35 billion DHS spending bill signed by the president on 4 October allocated $1.2 billion, but this represented only twenty per cent of the estimated $6 billion cost. The DHS bill further undermined the SFA by giving the executive branch considerable flexibility in how to spend the monies – for example on ‘virtual fencing’ and ‘tactical infrastructure’ – and by giving local elites a say in the fence’s location.​[46]​ Other immigration-security measures approved by the upper chamber ended Americans’ ability to travel outside the US without a passport, increased again the number of border patrol agents and expanded the number of beds at detention centers for captured undocumented persons. While senators were prepared to move some way toward the House’s more conservative position, they did not capitulate on the more radical enforcement-only provisions, such as requiring the DHS to stop all unlawful entry within 18 months, state and local law enforcement officials to enforce federal immigration law, and mandatory photo ID for voting. The outcome was a relatively moderate and modest legislative achievement but nonetheless surprising given the general sense in Washington in mid-to-late 2006 that Congress was deadlocked on the immigration issue. Many Democratic and some Republican senators were disappointed not have to approved either a temporary worker program or path to citizenship, but concluded that legislation promoting border security was a prerequisite for liberal reform. “Many people have told me they will support comprehensive immigration reform if we secure the border first. I hope we can use passage of this bill as a starting point toward long-term, comprehensive immigration reform” noted Republican Senator Sam Brownback.​[47]​ Bush took the same line: “Yes, I’ll sign it into law. I would view this as an interim step. I don’t view this as the final product.”​[48]​ Others thought any legislative achievement was better than none, and still others thought that it would help motivate core conservatives to turn out and vote. 

After more than a month of vacillation following the passage of the SFA, Bush staged a public signing of the law on 26 October in an attempt to motivate his base to turnout in the midterms, but did so at the risk of antagonizing Latinos. The short-term imperative of winning elections triumphed over the Bush-Rove strategy of building a long-term majority coalition. The administration’s outreach to the social conservatives was reinforced in late October when the president and vice-president appealed personally to key religious and conservative leaders for support and performed dozens of interviews on conservative talk shows and when forty two radio hosts – the vast majority conservative – broadcast live from the White House lawn, with many top officials including Rove, Rice and Rumsfeld available for interview. 

The Shifting Politics of Immigration Reform

Immigration reform in the 109th Congress was a divisive and damaging experience for the GOP. The reform agenda was driven by a president with an eye on his party’s future. It was resisted by rank-and-file Republicans in the House more concerned with their short-term reelection prospects. House Republicans complained privately that the White House had underestimated the electoral liability of supporting the Senate bill, while administration officials complained that members of congress had overestimated it, as well as discounted the possible long-term threat of further alienating Latino voters.​[49]​ But the president also faced an ideological as well as electoral barrier. His increasingly conservative House colleagues simply did not share his liberal beliefs on immigration. With security an overriding concern post 9/11 and with the president’s professional and public reputation diminished by Iraq and Katrina, the prospect of him persuading congressional colleagues to do his bidding on immigration were remote and grew remoter still as the debate matured. Yet Bush continued to invest time and energy and, most importantly, political capital. Bush’s televised national address in May ’06 raised the political stakes but the gamble backfired when conservative Republicans in the House rejected his comprehensive reform agenda. Many were bemused that the president was prepared to invest so much on an issue that so divided the party and appeared to run counter to the electoral instincts of representatives, but Bush was ideologically and strategically committed to reform. 

The failure of comprehensive reform and the partial success of the enforcement-only agenda clearly represent a victory for the conservative approach over the liberal one. However, it is important to note how far the debate has progressed in little over a decade. In the mid 1990s Republican politicians aspiring to national office tried hard to portray themselves as anti-immigrant – not just in favor of closing the door on illegal immigrants but reducing the number of legal immigrants and cutting their benefits, too. Even Democrats joined in. Yet today legalizing the status of over 10 million people illegally resident in the United States and setting up an extensive guest-worker program are firmly on the political agenda, put there by a Republican president. As the Latino population grows in size and becomes ever more politicized so the electoral imperatives of liberal immigration reform become more irresistible. What appears to many House Republicans a distant political change will perhaps in the next decade be a short-term electoral consideration. 
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